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█ Abstract This paper discusses Marraffa’s essay Mindreading and Introspection with regard to his views 
about (a) the presumed difference in the genealogies of mindreading (the capacity for reading others’ 
mental states) and introspection (the same capacity turned on one’s own mind) and (b) the faculties en-
tailed in both processes. Contra Marraffa, ontogenetic and phylogenetic arguments will be provided to 
argue for a common innate and modular origin of both processes (but the ontological and functional pri-
ority of third-person mindreading will be recognized). Furthermore, the theoretical and inferential nature 
of human psychological processes will be discussed in order to describe them in a way that more ade-
quately accounts for the complexity of the innate and acquired features of the human being. 
KEYWORDS: Mindreading; Introspection; Empathy; Theory of Mind. 
 
█ Riassunto Lettura della mente ed empatia – Questo articolo si propone di discutere alcune tesi sostenute 
in Mindreading and Introspection di Massimo Marraffa. Esse vertono sia sulla distinzione genealogica del 
mindreading (o abilità di lettura degli stati mentali altrui) rispetto all’introspezione (la stessa abilità volta 
su se stessi) sia sulle capacità implicate in entrambi i processi. Si sosterrà, contrariamente alla tesi 
dell’autore, la comune origine innata e modulare di entrambi i processi, in base ad argomentazioni di tipo 
sia filogenetico che ontogenetico, pur ammettendo la priorità ontologica e funzionale del mindreading in 
terza persona. Inoltre, la natura teorica ed inferenziale dei nostri processi psicologici sarà discussa in mo-
do da fornirne una descrizione più adeguata a rendere conto delle complesse prerogative, innate e acquisi-
te, della nostra natura di esseri umani. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Lettura della mente; Introspezione; Empatia; Teoria della mente. 
 
 
 
IN THIS PAPER I WILL discuss some claims 
made by Marraffa in his article. I agree with 
his fundamental idea of the evolutionary, 
functional and developmental priority of 
mindreading compared to introspection. No-
netheless, assigning the two a different onto-
logical status seems like a questionable move. 
According to Marraffa, mindreading – that is 
the reading of mental states from a third-
person point of view – is innate and is em-
bedded in the modular architecture of cogni-
tion. On the other hand, introspection is the 
outcome of social communication between 
the child and the adult caregiver.  
A distinction must be made, however, be-
tween process and content. With regard to 
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process, introspection exploits mindreading 
capacities and applies them to itself, but it 
does not seem «less “neurocognitively guar-
anteed”» than mindreading.1 Here intro-
spection is understood in its basic sense as 
the introspective recognition of the presence 
of the virtual inner space of the mind and 
should be distinguished from the concept of 
“social identity”. 
I would argue that this basic process is de-
rived from the same cognitive processes that 
shape mindreading. From an evolutionary 
point of view, the construction of a mature 
concept of self is not simply a later develop-
ment in temporal terms: it also requires 
much more sophisticated cognitive capaci-
ties, such as the linguistic capacity, which is 
crucial to one’s own biographical self-
description. 
Marraffa argues in favor of the inferential 
nature of both capacities and stresses the de-
fensive and markedly socio-constructivist 
character of introspection. This view is con-
vincing and enlightening (and is also sup-
ported by a large amount of experimental ev-
idence). It represents a significant effort to 
bridge the cognitivist and psychodynamic 
traditions, whose mutual epistemological en-
gagement is made possible by the adoption of 
a genuinely naturalistic perspective (con-
ceived as the framework of contemporary 
cognitive science). 
The evolutionary scenario that will be ex-
amined supports Marraffa’s innatist-modula-
rist view of mindreading. Such a scenario 
suggests that in order to best interpret the 
relation between attachment systems and 
mindreading, the two should be regarded as 
independent modules. They have the same 
precursors and refer to prosocial tendencies, 
some of which are common to both human 
beings and non-human primates. 
This last claim concerns the way in which 
mindreading works, both in the first and the 
third person. The two main approaches are 
“theory-theory” and “simulation theory” (the-
se are actually two families of approaches, 
since each one is articulated in various theo-
retical ways). Theory-theory describes the 
interpretive process of one’s own and others’ 
mental states as the application of a theoreti-
cal and conceptual apparatus, which is the 
range of general psychological laws driving 
our folk psychology.  
Simulation theory affirms the existence of 
two different mechanisms. The first is a sim-
ulative one that allows us to interpret other 
people’s behaviors and intentions from a 
third-person point of view, by taking on their 
roles. The second is an introspective mecha-
nism granting direct access to our own men-
tal states. Marraffa endorses the point of 
view of theory-theory, since it seems more 
apt to account for the complexity of the pro-
cesses underlying our social cognition.  
The view I would like to argue for, in line 
with K.R. Stueber’s remarks,2 is that both 
paradigms present an “abstract” picture of 
mental processes, because they do not take 
into account some important potentialities 
and dispositions, both innate and acquired, 
that are peculiar to human nature. Marraffa 
claims that interpretive psychological pro-
cesses are mechanisms triggered by infor-
mation about mind-external states of affairs, 
i.e., the subject’s behavior and the situation 
in which it occurs with respect to which the 
subject enjoys no particular epistemic au-
thority. 
Of course, if the subject’s particular epis-
temic authority is to be deduced by means of 
some theory of direct access to one’s own 
mental states, then I agree with the view that 
the subject does not enjoy any particular ep-
istemic authority at all. However, to provide 
just one example, the reading of someone’s 
behavior in relation to the context in which it 
takes place requires a “relevance theory” that 
must be taken into account. It is necessary to 
evaluate which elements of a context must be 
regarded as relevant (i.e. the subset of beliefs 
that we judge meaningful in order to explain 
a person’s behavior). Such a capacity is a hu-
man feature that cannot be formalized into a 
general theory (at any rate, no one has suc-
ceeded in formalizing it so far). 
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A limited view of our mental processes is 
also entailed by the idea that our folk psy-
chology is constituted by a set of general psy-
chological theories aimed at recognizing the 
causes of people’s behavior. Stueber rejects 
such an idea, since human psychology is not 
limited to explaining the causes of behavior. 
Human psychology will also detect the mo-
tives that constitute the subjective or objective 
reasons for a given behavior. This detection is 
always made from the agent’s point of view. 
Another’s perspective only becomes intel-
ligible through a simulative process, such as 
the empathic one. Empathy has an inferential 
and theoretical character, but at the same 
time allows one to take another’s point of 
view by considering his/her cognitive, affec-
tive and evaluative motives. However, Stue-
ber clearly states that empathy is the only 
mechanism that enables the mentalization 
process from an epistemological point of 
view. Reasons are recognizable as such since 
they are affectively marked and related to a 
set of values that steams from both our bio-
logical and cultural roots and our personal 
history. They have a strong socio-construc-
tivist character, but such a character must be 
evaluated within the broader framework of 
those features which make us human, given 
the genesis and nature of the mentalization 
process. 
 
█ Phylogenesis and mindreading 
 
Folk psychology – that is the capacity to 
explain and foresee one’s own and others’ be-
havior in terms of mental states – shapes our 
social behavior just like our perceptual facul-
ties guide us in the physical world. It is a uni-
versal and transcultural mechanism – a mostly 
automatic and heuristically powerful one. 
Our everyday practices as “mind-readers”, 
which may be more or less sophisticated, or-
dinarily work and allow us to interpret and 
communicate our own and others’ feelings 
and intentions. They allow humans to adapt 
to living in complex social contexts (although 
sometimes they fail to prevent us from mak-
ing big mistakes!). This mechanism is so 
powerful and pervasive that it may be ex-
tended to include the behavior of non-
human animals and also abstract shapes on a 
screen. Social psychology experiments show 
how the movements of these forms are inter-
preted anthropomorphically.3 From an anal-
ysis of these features as a whole, it may be af-
firmed that the mindreading capacity was se-
lected by the mechanism of evolution be-
cause it enhanced the fitness of our hominid 
ancestors in the Pleistocene.  
According to the “social brain” hypothe-
sis, life in progressively complex and crowded 
social groups is a selective pressure promot-
ing increasingly sophisticated cognitive func-
tions. Life conditions favor those individuals 
with “social intelligence”. This hypothesis is 
also confirmed by the fact that social intelli-
gence is not an exclusively human capacity, 
since it is shared by non-human primates that 
are phylogenetically close to Homo sapiens. 
These species exhibit forms of “Machia-
vellian intelligence” that are used to under-
stand others’ intentions, or at least their 
goals, in order to gain personal advantages.4 
Machiavellian intelligence is also exhibited 
through “tactical deception” behaviors. 
Among primates the most complex species 
from an evolutionary perspective live in large 
groups and this fact is correlated to the pro-
cess of encephalization, that is to the steady 
increase of brain volume as a response to se-
lective pressures demanding increasing com-
putational resources.  
It is likely that the social context is the 
most important selective pressure in the evo-
lutionary path towards mindreading. It must 
be remarked that from a Darwinian point of 
view the term “complexity”, both in intraspe-
cific and interspecific cases, does not entail 
any value judgement. The most complex 
(“higher”) cognitive capacities are not a bet-
ter product of evolution compared to less 
complex (“lower”) capacities. Here the use of 
the adjective “complex” simply refers to the 
degree of behavioral flexibility granted to an 
individual by a cognitive capacity in his/her 
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own ecological niche. Such flexibility increas-
es in proportion to the independence of a be-
havior from the agent’s genetic program. 
From a phylogenetic perspective, an in-
teresting hypothesis is put forward by Mi-
chael Tomasello,5 who introduces an im-
portant distinction in relation to the motiva-
tional macrosystems of competition and co-
operation (which are regarded as complemen-
tary and equivalent by Marraffa). According 
to Tomasello, the driving force of human cog-
nitive capacities (not only mindreading) is not 
just the complexity of social relations but also 
the particular shape they take. Human sociali-
ty is characterized by cooperation and sharing, 
while competition and agonistic interactions 
prevail in the social life of other primates.  
Collaborative interactions demand a far 
more sophisticated level of communication 
than competitive interactions (such as those 
for food or mating) for collaboration requires 
the coordination of behaviors and intentions 
towards shared goals. According to this per-
spective, whereas apes read others’ intentions 
for instrumental purposes, that is, for indi-
vidual goals that might represent an ad-
vantage for the group only incidentally, hu-
man beings are naturally motivated to coop-
erate with others towards a shared goal. Shar-
ing promotes flexibility and attention to al-
ternative points of view, which allows for 
what Tomasello defines as a “bird’s eye view” 
of interactions with others. Such interactions 
are characterized by mutual expectations 
that favor recursive mindreading.  
In this practice one’s point of view is 
modelled after that of others and both are 
aware of this attunement. The hypothesis of 
a prior role of the cooperative systems has 
many important consequences both on the 
phylogenetic and the ontogenetic level. Fur-
thermore, it must be noted that this hypothe-
sis contributes to promoting a concept of 
human nature more consistent with a genu-
ine Darwinian view (as opposed to the vari-
ous fallacious interpretations of Darwinian 
theory in terms of social Darwinism). The 
concept of cooperative system allows one to 
appreciate both the continuities between apes’ 
and humans’ capacities and the specific fea-
tures of Homo sapiens. It also highlights the 
prosocial (and not just relational) quality of 
human nature.  
This also explains complex cognitive ca-
pacities that are distinctly human such as 
mindreading and language. Also, according 
to Simon Baron-Cohen, the prerequisite for a 
theory of mind module is the capacity for 
shared attention, which allows two individu-
als engaged in communication to focus their 
attention on the same object.6 That module 
would have developed from a set of abilities, 
a sort of hierarchically organized system of 
modules which generated the theory of mind 
module. 
Such abilities are innate and implemented 
through non theory-based mechanisms work-
ing in a perceptual-like way. These are: the 
“detector of gaze direction” (that automati-
cally detects eye-shaped stimuli) and the “in-
tentionality detector” (reading others’ behav-
iors in terms of goal-directed actions). Unlike 
human babies, for example, young apes will 
focus their attention on head movements ra-
ther than on the direction of the gaze to spot 
the object of interest for another individual. 
As a matter of fact – as Tomasello remarks – 
Homo sapiens is the only species with the 
white eye sclera, a feature that has been an 
evolutionary advantage since it makes one's 
intentions more evident.7 
This evolutionary preamble is useful in 
two respects. First, it makes it possible to en-
visage a scenario that is consistent with Mar-
raffa’s basic tenets. More specifically, I am 
referring to the innatist and modularist view 
of mindreading as a capacity selected by evo-
lution thanks to its advantages for social life. 
I am also referring to the functional priority 
of a third-person perspective in the reading 
of mental states (which is equally justified 
from an evolutionary point of view). Second-
ly, from an epistemological point of view it is 
important to stress the need to always inves-
tigate mind-related topics through an evolu-
tionary and relational approach, that is, by 
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looking at human beings as complex systems. 
This is the dominant trend in today’s cogni-
tive science, whose task is to collect all the 
contributions from different disciplines com-
mitted to investigating the mind. 
Currently, neo-Darwinist arguments and 
appeals to systemic and relational approaches 
(i.e. in developmental psychology) are popu-
lar. Nonetheless, a number of experimental 
studies show that both these styles of thought 
are deeply counter-intuitive and that their 
practice requires constant critical training 
(and this is proof of the fact that evolution 
also selects less than perfect, non-designed 
mechanisms with limited purposes, such as 
our common sense psychology).8 
The traditional contrast between nature 
and culture is exemplary in this respect, as it 
reflects a misunderstanding both of the Dar-
winian perspective and of the relational ap-
proach. In general, it may be said that this 
contrast is not justified. From a Darwinian 
point of view, cultural processes are products 
of human biological nature whose limits and 
possibilities shape our learning capacities. 
Therefore, a fruitful research method cannot 
avoid analyzing the complexity of the rela-
tions affecting the phenomena under investi-
gation and shaping their genealogy and fea-
tures.  
 
█ Ontogenesis and mindreading 
 
According to the evolutionary framework 
explained above and the consequent innatist-
modularist conception of mentalization, the 
relationship between the mindreading system 
and the attachment system may be rooted in 
our innate inclination to prosociality. These 
inclinations could be precursors and trigger-
ing factors for both modules. Already in the 
womb, the fetus exhibits a set of capacities 
that make it possible for it to establish a re-
ciprocally regulating relationship with the 
environment, and not just at a physiological 
level. Afterwards, through the progressive 
development of its perceptual system, the fe-
tus can learn from experience, as shown by 
experiments testing the habituation para-
digm with regard to learning capacities in the 
prenatal period. Newborns have recognition 
memory and show preferences linked to their 
mother’s smell and voice (as well as stories 
heard during the prenatal period). 
Andrew Meltzoff and Alison Gopnik have 
conducted some important research on early 
facial imitation in newborns, a phenomenon 
former psychological research regarded as a 
later developmental achievement.9 Andrew 
Meltzoff and Keith M. Moore have shown 
that 12-21 day-old infants imitate tongue and 
lips protrusion and mouth opening.10 Facial 
imitation is peculiar since it happens without 
the baby making a direct visual comparison 
between his/her own face and the adult’s. For 
this reason the authors hypothesize that 
newborns have the innate capacity to detect 
the transmodal equivalence between the vis-
ual perception of another’s face and the pro-
prioceptive experience of their own facial 
movements. 
Furthermore, when faced with two inter-
acting adults, 14-month old babies are able to 
spot the one who is imitating them and will 
show a preference for him/her. This research 
reveals that newborns can detect the corre-
spondence between their own actions and 
those of others. According to the authors of 
the study, early facial imitation is notable 
with respect to the development of theory of 
mind since it represents the first example of 
infants’ innate capacity to link their internal 
states to visible reality. It is the ground of ear-
ly empathic relationships (whereas “empathy” 
is defined as the innate mechanism that allows 
the interpersonal communication of emotion-
al states from the caregiver to the child). 
The hypothesis is that the reproduction of 
a facial expression causes a given mental state 
and the corresponding physiological reac-
tions. It may be supposed that this basic form 
of empathy is grounded on some kind of mir-
roring mechanism that is empirically con-
firmed by the mirror neuron system. These 
neurons would be activated through the 
same discharge patterns both when the sub-
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jects watch an action and when they person-
ally perform an identical action. The action 
would be immediately perceived as a means 
to achieve a goal. The same mechanism of 
direct perception also concerns the recogni-
tion of the facial expressions for some basic 
emotions, such as fear and disgust, or sensa-
tions, such as feelings of touch and pain.  
These empirical data are a valuable source 
of knowledge but they can also be interpret-
ed in controversial ways. While setting out 
from very different positions with regard to 
the mechanism underlying our capacity for 
mindreading, some authors – such as Melt-
zoff and Moore or Alvin Goldman – claim 
that the mirroring mechanism acts like a 
kind of inferential process that allows the 
subject to ascertain that another individual is 
similar to him/her. Such a view entails that 
the infant is able to consciously evaluate 
his/her own internal states (and also to dis-
tinguish, reproduce and attribute them to 
others) and possesses a fully developed con-
ception of self (for in order to say that anoth-
er is like me I must already have the concept 
of “me”). In Goldman’s case, this would hap-
pen through a simulative process involving 
the hypothesis of a direct access to one’s own 
mental states, which has already been dis-
cussed and refuted by Marraffa. Goldman’s 
view can further be criticized on the basis of 
the anti-Cartesian argument against analogi-
cal inference: for if direct access to my own 
mental states is guaranteed by first person 
phenomenological experience, it is difficult 
to understand how my mental states might 
serve as a model through which to infer those 
of others. If the mirroring mechanism is in-
terpreted in a strong relational fashion, the 
process is not a unidirectional one, from the 
simulator to the target. 
On the contrary, mirroring is built upon a 
shared perception-like space whereby the 
meaning of one’s own actions and some phe-
nomenological experiences are immediately 
accessible to others and vice versa. Such basic 
and unconscious simulative processes are af-
fective, motoric and sensory. They may be 
seen to constitute a primary form of min-
dreading, which should be guaranteed both 
in the first and third person – contrary to 
Marraffa’s view. Here I am discussing the 
process itself, not its content. With regard to 
the concept of introspection, symmetrically 
to mindreading, Marraffa himself argues in 
favor of two different levels: introspection as 
the unaware acknowledgement of the exist-
ence of an inner virtual mind-space and in-
trospection as the capacity that drives the 
building of self. Here I am discussing the first 
level, which seems to coincide with the stage 
of development defined as the “social self” by 
György Gergely and John S. Watson.11 
The understanding of the self as a social 
agent relies upon the infant’s species-specific 
sensitiveness to the vocal and facial expres-
sions of the caregiver and upon his/her in-
nate propensity to engage in affective inter-
actions with this person. According to Gerge-
ly and Watson, the baby possesses a “contin-
gency detection module”, an innate mecha-
nism that makes him/her specifically reactive 
to the relations of temporal contingency be-
tween his/her own physical actions and the 
consequent environmental events. 
At about three months of age such a 
module would be tuned to the high, although 
not perfect, contingency correlations that are 
typical of social interactions. Gergely and 
Watson build “the social biofeedback theory 
of parental affect-mirroring” upon this idea. 
The repeated experience of contingent af-
fect-mirroring of the baby’s emotional ex-
pressions by the caregiver constitutes a kind 
of feedback that conveys to the infant infor-
mation about his/her own mental states 
through a gradual sensitization process. 
Therefore earlier forms of introspection may 
appear in the period between three and nine 
months as differential schemes of visceral and 
physiological activation linked to the expres-
sion of specific emotional states by the infant. 
These schemes are made salient by the 
caregiver’s contingent affect-mirroring. Em-
pathic mirroring fulfills two functions. First, 
it modulates the infant’s emotions (mostly 
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negative ones), regulating and restraining 
them. Second, it promotes the later develop-
ment of secondary representations of the ba-
by’s primary, procedural and unconscious, 
emotional states, by means of the introjec-
tion of the caregiver’s affect-mirroring ex-
pressions. According to Gergely and Watson, 
these secondary representations are the cog-
nitive tool needed to access one’s own emo-
tional states and attribute them to others. 
This idea is consistent with Marraffa’s claim 
that the capacity for introspection is the out-
come of the cooptation of the capacity of 
reading others’ minds and its application to 
oneself. In this respect, introspection has a 
markedly socio-constructivist character. 
 
█ Mindreading and empathy 
 
Although I agree with Marraffa’s view 
about the inferential nature of first and third 
person mindreading, I would argue that his 
account of human capacities is not complete. 
In particular, I would like to discuss the idea 
that the mentalization process is driven by 
theories elaborated from “external states of 
affairs” (the agent’s behavior and its sur-
rounding context) as well as the notion that 
the subject does not enjoy any particular ep-
istemic authority with regard to that process. 
First, it is important to stress the role of 
the mirroring processes described above. 
They entail direct sharing without the use of 
theories and they are proper acts of simula-
tion. They may be defined as forms of basic 
empathy, a pre-linguistic and pre-conceptual 
mechanism that allows subjects to detect, 
even unconsciously, that they and someone 
else have the same mental dispositions. This 
detection is triggered by specific behavioral 
displays, as in the case of the communication 
of emotions by means of facial expressions. It 
is an early, basic form of relational communi-
cation and sharing of information and mean-
ings. For this reason, empathy may be seen as 
the foundation of Tomasello’s “common 
ground”, that is the pieces of biologically and 
culturally originated knowledge we share 
with one or more individuals (emotions, be-
liefs and evaluations). Such a ground allows 
us to build a common semantic network, 
which is a world of shared meanings.12 
The common ground is both the precon-
dition for and the means for communicating, 
learning and reasoning in terms of folk psy-
chology. During its development it initially 
consists in the exchange of feelings and emo-
tions. Afterwards it allows us to direct others’ 
attention to objects of common interest. Fi-
nally, it makes shared intentional states pos-
sible and incorporates cognitive, affective 
and evaluative features. In communication 
empathy has both cognitive and social roles. 
From a cognitive point of view, it allows the 
subject who receives a message to identify 
his/her interlocutor’s intentions, which is 
what in the context is interesting to the inter-
locutor. From a social point of view, empathy 
makes the motives of that interest intelligi-
ble. Therefore, generally speaking, building 
common ground is not a process based on 
theory-based mechanisms but rather on re-
cursive mindreading (a kind of reading that 
sometimes is also promoted by empathy it-
self). The communicator and the receiver en-
gaged in communication share common 
knowledge – and are aware of sharing it.  
Hence, the communicating person ex-
pects the other to infer what feature of the 
context is relevant, while the latter knows 
that the communicator expects him/her to 
know what the interesting part of the context 
is from his/her point of view. The two indi-
viduals establish a web of cross-references 
and mutual expectations. This shared know-
ledge is created by (and in turn contributes to 
increase) a shared semantics that makes it 
possible to solve the so-called “frame prob-
lem”, that is the problem of understanding 
what is relevant to others and why. 
The meaning of someone’s behavior or 
belief is interpreted within a context of be-
haviors or beliefs ascribable to him/her and 
that are deemed relevant for interpretation 
(given that it would not be possible – or in-
deed economical or heuristically sensible – to 
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examine a whole system of beliefs). It is a ho-
listic process driven by a relevance criterion 
that cannot be formalized in a theory.13 
Therefore, our folk psychology is based on a 
principle of practical choice making that 
steers our interpretation of others’ mental 
processes by selecting a framework of rele-
vant assumptions (provided that a certain 
amount of true beliefs about the world are 
shared and that these are organized accord-
ing to a basic principle of consistency). 
We constantly attribute meanings to oth-
ers’ actions and our own, making correct 
guesses in the majority of cases. In other 
words, folk psychology works because human 
beings solve the frame problem even without 
any relevance theory. Therefore it seems in-
correct to conclude that meanings are at-
tributed to others’ actions only by means of a 
theory of mind-external states of affairs, as 
argued by Marraffa. Also, it is not possible to 
describe the processes and contents of our 
folk psychology as mere detectors of the 
causes of our behaviors. 
From these premises Stueber elaborates 
the concept of “reenactive empathy”, that is 
the capacity to reproduce the thought pro-
cesses of others, in terms of action-
motivating reasons (and not just causes of 
behavior) from the point of view of the oth-
er. This simulative process allows the inter-
preter to understand the particular reasons 
motivating an agent’s behavior. It cannot be 
described as a simple direct mirroring pro-
cess unrelated to the subject’s set of beliefs 
(as proposed by simulation theorists), nor as 
a merely theoretical process (as stated by 
theory-theory supporters). Understanding 
human behavior in complex social situations 
must imply the knowledge (and use) of con-
cepts such as desire and belief and of the pos-
sible interactions between the various kinds 
of mental states. 
The question is to what extent such gen-
eral knowledge is necessary and sufficient to 
understand others’ minds. According to 
Stueber, it is necessary but neither sufficient 
nor epistemically central. He appeals to the 
concept of reenactive empathy, which is 
more complex than basic empathy. Without 
reenactive empathy folk psychology would 
not be possible. The demonstration of the 
epistemic centrality of reenactive empathy 
relies on two a priori arguments, derived 
from Robin G. Collingwood14 and first applied 
to the contemporary philosophy of mind by 
Jean Heal.15 The first argument concerns the 
essential contextuality of thoughts as reasons. 
Understanding a thought as a reason means 
not just identifying the object of that thought 
(to think “X thinks that P” I must also think 
“that P” in my turn), as simulation theorists 
claim, or understanding its relations with 
other beliefs, as theory-theory supporters ar-
gue. Rather, it is necessary to grasp both the 
beliefs relevant to the agent in that context 
and the relation between that thought and 
the behavior it generates. 
Theories of inference (deducing from a 
thought another derived thought) can inform 
us about logically correct inferences, but not 
about which inferences are proper in a given 
context. Evaluating the appropriateness of a 
thought in the light of a set of beliefs that are 
all equally relevant in a given context is a 
practical ability that cannot be learnt 
through any theory. It is plausible that in or-
der to think someone else’s thought we must 
not merely think the same object of thought 
as this person, but also use our own thoughts 
to grasp the other’s thinking processes by 
means of reeanactive empathy. 
This is made possible by the common 
ground built with the other individual. This 
does not merely consist in the sum of knowl-
edges previously acquired about the other 
individual, but also includes affective and 
evaluative features that help to understand 
the subset of the beliefs that are relevant in 
that given context for that particular agent. 
These beliefs work as motives, i.e., they are 
the reasons that lead the agent to behave in 
one way rather than another. Stueber does 
not use the definitions “common ground” or 
“shared cognition”, supposedly because he is 
persuaded that taking someone’s else role en-
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tails a series of evaluative features. Such fea-
tures are mostly affective rather than cogni-
tive in a strict sense. 
Drawing upon ideas developed by Antonio 
Damasio16 and Peter Goldie,17 Stueber states 
that «emotions or the ability to respond emo-
tionally to the world be regarded as Nature's 
way of solving the frame problem».18 Evolu-
tionary theory highlights the adaptive value 
of primary emotions: they quickly and auto-
matically select classes of specific somatic 
and behavioral responses (with a high sur-
vival value) to given classes of stimuli. 
According to Damasio, emotions are so-
matic markers because they predispose the 
body to a specific behavioral response. In an 
innovative way, Damasio widens the concept 
of somatic marker to include secondary emo-
tions produced by social learning. Through 
experience, cognitively complex decisional 
processes allow humans to learn to associate 
pleasurable and unpleasant body feelings to 
the possible outcomes predicted by our imag-
ination every time a choice is to be made. In 
this case the “emotion” – so to speak – mani-
fests itself in the body as a qualitative re-
sponse, for example an unpleasant feeling in 
the pit of the stomach, and operates a prima-
ry selection among possible choices on the 
basis of alternative scenarios with respect to 
a given state of affairs. 
Through these hedonic states humans 
perform an initial rough categorization of 
events from the point of view of their rele-
vance to them. It is a quick (and hence effec-
tive) and fairly reliable mechanism to make 
choices, even if it is not necessarily a con-
scious one. It qualitatively shapes the deci-
sional process in the light of previous experi-
ences. In other words, it informs our perspec-
tive on the world. 
When this mechanism does not work 
properly and the agent simply acts on the ba-
sis of a cold risk-benefit calculation, the 
whole cognitive and social sphere of intelli-
gence and behavior becomes maladaptive 
and dysfunctional, although the specific cor-
tical associative functions are not damaged 
and IQ is in the normal range. This point is 
illustrated by Damasio through an examina-
tion of both some patients with specific neu-
rological damage and of some classes of psy-
chiatric cases. Apparently trivial or minor 
choices require great lengths of time, because 
of the virtually never-ending examination of 
the pros and cons. Indeed, when solving 
problems the agent no longer acts by follow-
ing a sensible order of priorities. 
Furthermore, relational behavior as a 
whole is altered and inappropriate and the 
subject breaches social conventions and 
norms. The conclusion is that emotions play 
a key role in the whole economy of our ra-
tional processes. Reenactive empathy is a 
simulative process that holds together rea-
sons and emotions within the agent’s point of 
view. This process founded on natural selec-
tion and social education solves the frame 
problem, since it detects the appropriateness 
(or inappropriateness) of reasons as motives 
justifying behaviors. 
The second a priori argument used by 
Stueber to support the concept of reenactive 
empathy concerns the essential indexicality 
of thoughts as reasons. To recognize a 
thought as a reason it is first necessary for the 
agent to recognize it as his/her own thought 
from a first person perspective. The indexical 
use of the first person pronoun refers to the 
irreducibility of the meaning of the concept 
“I”, which cannot be deduced from any defi-
nition and cannot further be analyzed in 
terms of an equivalent semantic thought. I 
can give many descriptions of myself – as a 
person with a certain appearance, born on a 
given day, living in a given place and think-
ing certain thoughts – but these descriptions 
are all pointless if I do not think that “I” am 
that person and that those thoughts are 
“mine”. The datum of irreducibility is de-
scriptive and shows a lack of explication. So 
far there is no empirical evidence of any link 
between this phenomenal datum and some 
neurobiological fact.19 
From an evolutionary point of view, we 
know neither when nor how this feature of 
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human thinking evolved, even though accord-
ing to a Darwinian perspective it may be hy-
pothesized that it is a phenomenon derived 
from more elementary capacities related to 
the perception of body schemes. It may be as-
sumed that at first the infant has a perception 
of himself/herself from a third person per-
spective and only gradually builds a sense of 
“mineness” or “ownership” of his/her own ex-
perience from a first person point of view. 
Once reenactive empathy is assumed as a 
method to evaluate the agent’s mental states 
as subjective motivation by adopting his/her 
own point of view, any appeal to general psy-
chological laws becomes pointless. Further-
more, the choice between laws that are equal-
ly valid on the normative level but have dif-
ferent practical outcomes must be made on 
the basis of a reference theory requiring the 
same empathic process of identification. Any 
interpretative hypothesis about mental pro-
cesses which is bound to have as its starting 
point a plurality of remarks about affections, 
cognitions and evaluations will only be plau-
sible if it takes into consideration the other 
person's motivations, assuming his/her own 
point of view. 
Empathy is fallible and is not self-verify-
ing, since there are no norms for its criteria 
of application and validation. It depends on a 
kind of practical judgement about the degree 
of plausibility attributed to a given explana-
tion. The yardstick is subjective, but the 
charge of interpretative relativism must be 
rejected. The various hypotheses can be 
compared and critically examined in the light 
of rationality criteria and empirical evidence. 
The comprehension of the point of view of 
another person the capacity for taking an-
other’s role, is a type of learning that evolves 
through a continuous (and desirable) ex-
change between cultural growth and a refin-
ing of sensibility throughout the course of 
one’s life. 
The limits of our empathic capacities are 
inversely proportional to the degree to which 
we share our experiences. From an evolu-
tionary point of view, sharing has advantages 
for affiliation and is linked to the develop-
ment of a sense of self into a community. The 
greater the distance among individuals, the 
harder the process of identification by means 
of the imagination. According to David 
Hume, sympathy can potentially be broad-
ened to any sentient being, non-human ani-
mals included, provided that their condition 
has some connection with ours. Likeness and 
spatial/temporal contiguity relations further 
sympathy: 
 
where, beside the general resemblance of 
our natures, there is any peculiar similari-
ty in our manners, or character, or coun-
try, or language, it facilitates the sympa-
thy […] We sympathize more with per-
sons contiguous to us, than with persons 
remote from us: With our acquaintance, 
than with strangers: With our country-
men, than with foreigners.20 
 
The distance that prevents the extension 
of our empathic capacities to someone else 
does not consist only in differences in back-
ground, i.e., in the incompatibility of differ-
ent sets of beliefs. Rather, it largely concerns 
the integration of those beliefs into an en-
semble of affections and evaluations. Some 
evaluations are regarded as important for 
one’s own personal welfare and that of one's 
community. Adhesion to these evaluations is 
affectively connoted, shapes social emotions 
(such as shame or guilt) and provides the 
foundation for moral habits. Information ac-
quired in a purely cognitive manner is quali-
tatively different from knowledge somehow 
affectively experienced. Once knowledge of 
this last kind has been emotionally integrated 
within our set of beliefs (and eventually wid-
ened and tested by the imagination), it can 
trigger profound changes and contribute to 
redefine and rebalance our evaluations and 
our perspectives on ourselves and others. 
One must recognize the inferential char-
acter of both introspective and empathic 
processes in order to recognize one’s own 
motivations and those of others as reasons 
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for action. Nonetheless, contrary to what 
Marraffa has argued, I would contend that a 
particular epistemic authority can be at-
tributed to both processes, since they possess 
some innate and learnt, biological and cul-
tural, features that help to define the concept 
of human nature. When explaining mental 
processes, sticking to this concept is essential 
if one is to steadily uphold a genuine natural-
istic perspective and avoid forms of relativ-
ism inspired, for example, by unscientific 
radical socio-constructivist views. 
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